AFRICA AND THE WAR ON GLOBAL TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

NOVEMBER 15, 2001

Serial No. 107–46

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.house.gov/international_relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

76–191PDF WASHINGTON : 2001

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois, *Chairman*

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
JAMES A. LEACH, Iowa
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ELTON GALLEGLY, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina
DANA ROHRABACHER, California
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California
PETER T. KING, New York
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio
AMO HOUGHTON, New York
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
RON PAUL, Texas
NICK SMITH, Michigan
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
ERIC CANTOR, Virginia
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia

TOM LANTOS, California
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American Samoa
DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
CYNTHIA A. MCKINNEY, Georgia
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
BRAD SHERMAN, California
ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
JIM DAVIS, Florida
ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
GRACE NAPOLITANO, California
ADAM B. SCHIFF, California
DIANE E. WATSON, California

THOMAS E. MOONEY, SR., *Staff Director/General Counsel*
ROBERT R. KING, *Democratic Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, *Chairman*

AMO HOUGHTON, New York
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
JEFF FLAKE, Arizona
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
BARBARA LEE, California
EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama

THOMAS P. SHEEHY, *Subcommittee Staff Director*
CHARISSE GLASSMAN, *Democratic Professional Staff Member*
MALIK M. CHAKA, *Professional Staff Member*
ALYSSA JORGENSON, *Staff Associate*

CONTENTS

AFRICA AND THE WAR ON GLOBAL TERRORISM

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:12 p.m., in Room 2200 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce [Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. ROYCE. This hearing on the Subcommittee on Africa will come to order. This hearing will be titled Africa and the War on Global Terrorism. U.S. policies toward all regions of the world have been forced to adjust to the post-September 11th world. It is clear that in the fight against terrorism no region can be ignored, and that is especially true of Africa.

The general weakness of African governments, as well as the civil strife which exists in several countries, makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations. International terrorist cells are believed to be operating in several African countries.

The abundant natural resources of the continent provide a ripe target for unscrupulous exploitation, including terrorist organizations seeking financial gains. The Subcommittee is particularly concerned by recent reports that al-Qaeda has been dealing in diamonds with Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front, and also with Liberia's President, Charles Taylor. I notice Ambassador Lee in the audience, thank you, Ambassador, for being with us. It is far overdue that we got serious about Liberia and serious about Charles Taylor.

African governments have been largely supportive of the U.S.-led coalition against global terrorism. The comments of former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa deserve to be highlighted. On Tuesday, in his words, Nelson Mandela said,

> "There is no other alternative for the United States but to go into Afghanistan in order to apprehend Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group. In that regard, I support the United States without any reservation."

The American people appreciate this powerful support.

But nevertheless a small number of Africans, predominantly Muslims, have expressed anger and opposition to the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign against the Taliban. Anti-American protests have taken place in Nigeria, in South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania, and else-

where. Some believe that segments of Africa's large Muslim population will make it difficult for certain African governments to provide continued support to the United States and may even prove to be a recruiting base for international terrorist organizations.

There is evidence that traditional and tolerant Islamic practices in African countries are being increasingly influenced negatively by economic support and anti-Western pressure coming from foreign countries, including, most importantly, Saudi Arabia. This is of great concern to me.

Osama bin Laden is no stranger to Africa. He took shelter in Sudan between 1991 and 1996. U.S. authorities have charged him and al-Qaeda operatives with the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned Sudan and Somalia, among other countries, not to harbor terrorists who may be fleeing Afghanistan. The current global economic slowdown, which was intensified by the terrorist attacks, will hit Africa hard, I fear, further agitating political waters and perhaps contributing to opposition to the U.S.-led anti-terrorist effort. With all these developments, Africa must be placed in the U.S.'s strategic spotlight.

The Bush Administration has recognized Africa's centrality to the war on terrorism. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, while speaking on October 30 to over 100 African ministers gathered in Washington for the African Growth and Opportunity Act Forum, said this,

> "Africa's history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war on terrorism. Nevertheless, some Africans have expressed concerns that U.S. attention and resources devoted to Africa will be shorted in favor of the Middle East and South Asia. This should not be the case under any circumstances. Africa is critical to our war on terrorism."

Let me now turn to Mr. Payne, who is the Ranking Member, and, if I could ask him if he has any comments to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE EDWARD R. ROYCE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

WASHINGTON, D.C.—The following is the statement made by Africa Subcommittee Chairman Ed Royce (R–CA) at today's hearing on the role of Africa in the war on global terrorism.

"U.S. policies toward all regions of the world have been forced to adjust to the post-September 11 world. It is clear that in the fight against terrorism, no region can be ignored, especially not Africa. The general weakness of African governments as well as the civil strife, which exists in several countries, makes parts of the continent hospitable grounds for terrorist operations. International terrorist cells are believed to be operating in several African countries. The abundant natural resources of the continent provide a ripe target for unscrupulous exploitation, including by terrorist organizations seeking funds. The subcommittee is particularly concerned by recent reports that al Qaeda has been dealing in diamonds with Sierra Leone's Revolutionary United Front and Liberia's President Charles Taylor. It is far overdue that we got serious about Liberia and Charles Taylor.

"African governments have been largely supportive of the U.S.-led coalition against global terrorism. The comments of former President Nelson Mandela of South Africa deserve to be highlighted. On Tuesday, this statesman said, 'There was no other alternative for the United States but to go into Afghanistan in order to apprehend Bin Laden and his terrorist group. In that regard I support the United

States without any reservation.' The American people appreciate this powerful support.

"Nevertheless a small number of Africans, predominately Muslims, have expressed anger and opposition to the U.S. anti-terrorism campaign against the Taliban. Anti-American protests have taken place in Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya, Tanzania and elsewhere. Some believe that segments of Africa's large Muslim population will make it difficult for certain African governments to provide continued support to the U.S., and may even prove to be a recruiting base for international terrorist organizations. There is evidence that traditional and tolerant Islamic practices in African countries are being increasingly influenced negatively by economic support and anti-Western pressures coming from foreign countries, including Saudi Arabia. This is of great concern to me.

"Osama bin Laden is no stranger to Africa. He took shelter in Sudan between 1991 and 1996. U.S. authorities have charged him and al Qaeda operatives with the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairoba and Dar es Salaam. On Tuesday, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned Sudan and Somalia, among other countries, not to harbor terrorists who may be fleeing Afghanistan. The current global economic slowdown, intensified by the terrorist attacks, will hit Africa hard, further roiling political waters and perhaps contributing to opposition to the U.S.-led anti-terrorist effort. With all these developments, Africa must be placed in the U.S.' strategic spotlight

"The Bush administration has recognized Africa's centrality to the war on terrorism. National Security Advisor Rice, while speaking on October 30 to over 100 African ministers gathered in Washington for the African Growth and Opportunity Act Forum, said 'Africa's history and geography give it a pivotal role in the war [on terrorism].' Nevertheless some Africans have expressed concerns that U.S. attention and resources devoted to Africa will be shorted in favor of the Middle East and South Asia. This should not be the case under any circumstances. Africa is critical to our war on terrorism.

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will condense my comments and leave my statement for the record since we don't know when the bells are going to ring to vote. So let me just, first of all, thank Mr. Royce for calling this important hearing.

We all know that September 11 changed everything as we know it, and that is a day that will certainly live in infamy. I must say that this tragedy has changed the scope and focus of foreign policy around the world. In the wake of America's singular focus on the fight against international terrorism, it is unfortunate that issues such as AIDS and the HIV pandemic, economic development, democracy-building, and other programs which beset Africa, has seemed to be put on the back burner.

As a matter of fact, I am very distressed to know that $88 million from development assistance have been diverted from those funds, therefore, making less money available for the problems on the continent. We cannot fight terrorism by putting funds into one region and diverting them from another.

And so I just want to say that, to me, this is an opportunity to improve and enhance our presence in Africa. I think that Africa is right in the middle and it can go either way. We have, for too long, neglected Africa. We have not put in the resources that we should have been putting into Africa.

Anytime there are large numbers of unemployed people, large numbers of young people who have no future, then there are breeding grounds for terrorists. We see that in Afghanistan and the number of young persons from the Arab world, from Pakistan and from Saudi Arabia, and other countries, who are in Afghanistan as fighters. They have been there for a decade because they have nothing else to do, nowhere else to go—no one to look up to.

So we don't want the same conditions to happen in Africa. They are not there now. We are at the crossroads, and it will be our public policy which will determine whether we will be able to prevent the pendulum from swinging in the wrong direction. This is the time to look at our policies and see how we can strengthen, not weaken, the policies that we have.

We have to also be concerned about situations which are happening, for example, in Sudan where the Islamic—National Islamic Front there, as we saw in Algeria, are trying to say that you must—the state must be Islamic and we will take other people and convert them and make them see it our way. We have an opportunity to defeat that in Africa and not to let it go any further than what it has gone.

And so I am here saying that I look forward to hearing our witnesses. And, once again, as I indicated, I appreciate you calling this hearing. I think we are at the crossroads in Africa.

Let me also state that the African Diplomatic Corps presented to me a letter that it sent immediately to President Bush, immediately following September the 11th.

We did see President Obasanjo at the White House about a week ago where President Bush invited him. And I think there could probably be no better spokesperson on the problems between Islam and Christianity because he is living it every day. And, as I indicated, if I were the President, I would have had him at the White House 4 or 5 days after the tragedy occurred to try to get advice on how he is dealing with it and what mistakes he might be making and what things he is doing right and how we can better understand how we deal with this problem.

It is important that we not confuse the Muslim religion in general with fundamentalism and extremism. The Islamic faith is a beautiful faith. And I think that we want people to understand and know this. And one of our weaknesses that we spent so little time understanding Islam that we now are trying to catch up. So, Mr. Chairman, let me yield back the balance of my time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Payne follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD M. PAYNE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling this hearing on "Africa and the War on Global Terrorism." September 11th is a day that will live in infamy. That day will forever change the scope and focus of foreign policy all over the world.

In the wake of America's singular focus on the fight against international terrorism, issues such as AIDS and economic development, unfortunately, will take the back seat. Indeed, U.S.-Africa relations are likely to change in a fundamental way because of the renewed focus on terrorism. While it is understandable to put all our energies in the fight against terrorism, we must remain engaged in Africa. I am deeply concerned about the $88 million dollars in the Development Assistance Account designated for Africa. I hope we aren't thinking of diverting this pot of money to accounts in Afghanistan.

Some may argue that Africa is not relevant in the fight against international terror. I say think again. Africa may not be strategically relevant in this phase of the military campaign, but Africa's participation in winning this war against terror is, without a doubt, pivotal. Let us not forget the birth place of Al-Qaeda—Sudan—where its founder, Osama bin Laden, spent five years establishing his network of terror.

The same government that is in power today in Khartoum was the same government that gave sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and other terrorist groups. It is im-

portant for Washington to continue its cooperation on terrorism with Khartoum, but we broaden the focus Khartoum's bombing campaign in the south.

Meanwhile, another African country has emerged as a focus of attention in Washington—Somalia. In late September, the Bush Administration added al-Ittihad, a Somali group active in Somalia and Somali-populated areas of Ethiopia, to the list of terror suspect organizations whose assets were ordered frozen by a presidential Executive Order.

According to a Washington Post article (November 4, 2001), "an interagency working group involving analysts from the State Department, Pentagon, CIA, and the National Security Council has been meeting for the past three weeks to discuss where and how al-Qaeda operates in the East Africa country."

In conclusion, if our campaign against international terrorism is to be successful, we must not confuse Muslim fundamentalism and extremism with the beautiful Islamic religion.

Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Mr. Payne. Any other opening statements? Ms. Lee.

Ms. LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and our Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, for calling today's hearings on terrorism as it relates to the African Continent. I also want to welcome and thank our panelists for being here. It is very good to see all of you.

The role of Africa in the war on global terrorism is extremely relevant and must not be underestimated. In the wake of September 11, and in our efforts to bring the terrorists responsible to justice, it is important that the United States look once again at our policy toward Africa.

As the United States develops partnerships with African nations, we must continue to develop and promote policies in regions of Africa with high poverty rates, large refugee populations, and porous borders. These policies can help to mitigate factors that lead to terrorism recruitment.

I look forward to hearing from our panelists about how you believe that the United States can increase its efforts to assist countries where terrorists could seek refuge. I would also like to know the status of the United States, as well as other western nations, efforts to urge and assist African nations, to develop extradition treaties, which focus on capturing terrorists. It would also be helpful to know your views on a strategy for helping to build anti-terrorist capabilities in Africa and what resources you envision to accomplish this task.

The impact of the terrorist attacks in the United States has devastated our economy, killed thousands of people, and its repercussions have spread far beyond our borders. Many African nations rely heavily upon revenue generated by tourism. And we have heard in our meetings, subsequent to today, from African leaders, that since September 11, tourism revenues have dropped dramatically. The outcome of this will surely affect the national economies in Africa and have the potential to further exacerbate poverty.

So, again, I want to thank our panelists. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for calling this very important hearing today.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you very much. Mr. Hilliard, go ahead, sir.

Mr. HILLIARD. Thank you very much. I just wish to thank you for what you have done in calling this hearing and thank the panel for what I hope will be a meaningful discussion.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I wish to associate my remarks with our Ranking Member, Ms. Lee, and Mr. Hilliard. I agree, we need to do all we can for Africa. And on that note, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act has been a great asset. I am glad to see that we will be enhancing these benefits tomorrow when we have the vote on the AGOA II provisions.

So with that said, I wanted to introduce Susan Rice, who actually needs no introduction. She has testified before this Committee on numerous occasions while she was Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, from 1997 until last year. Before that, Dr. Rice served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council. Dr. Rice received a Bachelor's in History from Stanford University and she earned her doctorate in International Relations at Oxford.

Dr. Stephen Morrison is the Director of the African Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he had led reviews of U.S./Africa policy in key areas, most recently, the impact of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Dr. Morrison previously worked with the State Department in Policy and Planning. He also worked with the Agency for International Development, and from '87 to '91, he was a Senior Staff Member with this Subcommittee. Dr. Morrison is a graduate of Yale University and earned a doctorate in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin.

Dr. Sulayman Nyang is a Full Professor in the African Studies Department at Howard University. He is an internationally recognized scholar on Islam in Africa, who has written and edited several books, including *Islam, Christianity, and African Identity*. Dr. Nyang has served as a Consultant for the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program. And the professor completed his undergraduate education at Hampton University and received a master's and doctorate at the University of Virginia.

I think this is probably the first time this Subcommittee has had a panel of all Ph.D's., and I guess we are set for a good hearing. Dr. Rice, please summarize your statement for the record.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. RICE, CONSULTANT ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS (FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE)

Ms. RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, distinguished Members. Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee today. It is nice to be back as a private citizen.

I am sure you have heard, as I have, many times since September 11, the familiar refrain, that it is quite a shame that Africa will now get fewer resources and zero attention in the context of the new focus on terrorism. And while I think we all would acknowledge the conventional wisdom underlying that sentiment, I can think of no outcome that would be more shortsighted and, indeed, more dangerous if we are not just to fight, but ultimately to win the global war on terror.

That is because, in my judgment, Africa is unfortunately the world's soft underbelly for global terrorism. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells are active throughout East, Southern, and West Africa, not to mention North Africa. These organizations hide throughout

Africa. They plan, finance, train for, and execute terrorist operations in many parts of Africa, not just from Sudan and Somalia.

Terrorist organizations take advantage of Africa's porous borders, weak law enforcement and security services, and nascent judicial institutions to move men, weapons, and money around the globe. They also take advantage of poor, disillusioned populations, often with religious or ethnic grievances, to recruit for their jihad against the civilized world. In short, terrorist networks are exploiting Africa thoroughly. And in the process, they are directly threatening our national security.

What are we doing about it? Mr. Chairman, I would say, not nearly enough. President Bush has, in my opinion, defined well the global nature of the threat we face and the necessity of a comprehensive, long-term response. He has got all of the right component parts of that comprehensive strategy, but I think two critical pieces are missing.

First and foremost, we must help those countries in Africa and elsewhere that have the will to cooperate with us on the war on terrorism, but lack the means. There are plenty of countries that can't act to defend their own citizens from terror, much less our own. And we only need recall that Kenya and Tanzania lost over 200 of their own and 5,000 wounded.

We also ought to recall the difficulty the United States is having defending our homeland from these sorts of threats. And then, imagine how hard it must be for African countries that are impoverished, have fragile institutions, deficient infrastructure, widespread corruption, for them to be effective partners with the U.S. on the war on terrorism.

I was very pleased to hear President Bush say in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly that we would help such countries. But we don't yet seem to have in place a strategy to do so and we certainly haven't set aside the necessary resources to implement such a strategy.

It is imperative, in my judgment, that we invest tens of millions of dollars annually in helping build counter-crime and counter-terrorism capacity in a number of African countries. We started programs and we had in place strategies to that effect under the previous Administration. We had early and modest sums of money, but not nearly enough to do what we must do now on the scale we must do it.

We have to help African counties take the necessary steps to control their borders, improve intelligence collection, strengthen law enforcement and security services, and build effective, transparent judicial institutions. And it is not enough to do this simply in Nigeria and South Africa and other big countries, but over time we have to do it throughout the continent because the problem is continental in scope.

Second, over the longer term, we have to drain the swamps where the terrorists breed. Many of these are obviously in the Middle East and South and Central Asia, but many are also in Africa today and, I fear, potentially in the Caribbean and Latin America tomorrow. Islam is a fast-growing and large religion in Africa. And that, in itself, I want to be extremely clear, is not a concern. Islam is a religion of peace. But the fact that some of Islam's most radical

and anti-American adherents are increasingly active from South Africa to Sudan, from Nigeria to Algeria, ought to be of great concern to us.

Much of Africa has become a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, young, disaffected, unhealthy, undereducated populations often have no stake in government, no faith in the future, and harbor an easily exploitable discontent with the status quo. And, perhaps, that is part of the reason why we have seen an increase in recent years in the number of African nationals engaged in international terrorism.

These are the swamps we must drain. And we must do so for the cold, hard reason that to do otherwise, we are going to place our national security at further and more permanent risk.

To drain these swamps, we must reduce this burgeoning hostility and address its sources. We must view it as our fight, not just the developing world's, to close the gaps between rich and poor. Without progress on this front, throughout the developing world, we should expect bin Laden and future such enemies to find a growing constituency for their radical form of Islam, whose chief tenet is hatred of the United States and the civilized world.

Fighting this battle will not be swift or cheap. America, leading our partners in the developed world, both in the public and private sectors, will have to invest on a scale previously inconceivable, if we are to defend ourselves against this pervasive threat. We will have to open our markets completely to goods and services from the developing world, provide much more trade and investment financing, bridge the digital divide, increase assistance for education, especially for girls, build necessary health infrastructure and treat the infected, invest greater resources in debt relief and in finding a vaccine for HIV/AIDS. And we must do more to help professionalize Africa's militaries.

In short, we will have to pay the price, billions and billions, to lift the peoples of Africa and other underdeveloped regions out of poverty and hopelessness. If we do not, we will reap the harvest of a disaffected generation's hostility and growing anti-Americanism, from the Middle East to Central and South Asia and, indeed, to Africa.

It goes without saying that the United States cannot do this alone. Nor could all the developed countries on earth do it together. African peoples and African governments will have to provide the leadership, the transparency, the will and the commitment to forge a better future. Without this, all well-intentioned efforts will fail.

But with mutual commitment and serious sustained investment, we can achieve mutual security, and even, over the long term, mutual prosperity.

Unfortunately, these are, by necessity, budget-busting times. And I am afraid it is not enough simply to ramp up spending, as we are and, I believe, we must, for defense and intelligence. We also have to dramatically increase resources in the Foreign Operations accounts to help would-be partners in Africa and elsewhere to fight with us side by side in the war on terrorism.

The Foreign Operations budget is all but final, and, regrettably, it is business as usual—almost a straight-line appropriation. And

Africa, after several years of progressively increasing resources, will predictably and shortsightedly get less than last year.

Now is the time to reverse that trend. We cannot realistically hope to win a truly comprehensive global war on terrorism without substantial additional Foreign Operations resources. I believe if we are going to fight this war big, we also have to fight it smart.

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, in my testimony I go on to talk about the particular concerns and challenges we face with respect to Sudan and Somalia. With your permission, I would like to spend a couple of minutes on Sudan.

Mr. ROYCE. By all means. Dr. Rice, by all means.

Ms. RICE. I don't have to tell anybody on this Subcommittee that Sudan has been an aggressive and active state sponsor of terrorism. It has been, for many years, the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security.

But suddenly and rapidly in the wake of September 11, according to Administration officials, Sudan has begun meaningful cooperation with the United States on terrorism. If this is true, it is a good thing. Fear, in this case of more American military strikes, can be a good motivator. But will it be a converter? Time will tell.

If Sudan, indeed, provides meaningful, comprehensive, and sustained cooperation to the United States on terrorism, we ought to acknowledge it. But we cannot forget Sudan's past role in plots to destroy American people and interests, but we can seize all valuable assistance in our current battle.

But given Sudan's past, it has a very long way to go if it is to be a credible member in good standing in this global coalition against terrorism. I outline a number of specific steps that I believe Sudan has to take to meet that qualification and I want——

Mr. ROYCE. Let us go over those steps.

Ms. RICE. Go over them?

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE. Yes, sir. To achieve such standing, Sudan must detain, offer for interrogation, and, if requested, render to the United States or responsible partners all suspected terrorists within their borders. Sudan must share all intelligence on terrorist networks and activities, past and present. It must freeze the assets and shut down the businesses, NGOs, and charities that provide financial lifelines to all U.S.-designated terrorist organizations active in Sudan, not just al-Qaeda. And, by this, I mean, they can't claim that Hamas and Hizballah and other organizations are not, in fact, terrorist organizations. Sudan also has to close down all terrorist training camps and allow them to be inspected on a random basis. It must crack down on the issuance of visas, which is loose, and the abuse of its passports. And Sudan must halt the mobilization for the war in the South on the basis of jihad.

I believe if Sudan falls short on any of these criteria, it ought to be reminded swiftly of President Bush's promise to go after unreconstructed state sponsors of terrorism, the way we have gone after the Taliban.

And, moreover, and, I think, very importantly, we need to separate the issues of potential Sudanese cooperation on terrorism from our long-standing objections to Sudan's human rights abuses, its prosecution of the civil war, which is brutal, its use of humani-

tarian assistance as a weapon, its religious persecution in its efforts to destabilize neighboring states.

The Administration has to make plain to Sudan that cooperation on terrorism will not afford it a get out of jail free card on any other aspects of the agenda. We ought to maintain, in my view, and if possible, increase pressure on Sudan to change fundamentally its behavior. And by that, I mean, we ought not to lift bilateral sanctions or alter the fundamentals of our bilateral relationship with Sudan until Sudan demonstrates a conversion in deeds, not just words.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I might say one brief final thing on embassy security. Despite the shock and the robust U.S. response to the embassy bombings in Africa in 1998, we have yet to take all the necessary steps to secure our personnel in our embassies in Africa. Secretaries Albright and Powell both sought and have received more resources for embassy security. But 3 years later, we have completed construction of only one new facility in Africa. That is not because former colleagues in the State Department are slow or slacking. It is because these resources have been staggered in small—relatively small increments over many past and future years.

So that 3 years later after the bombings, at least three-quarters of our embassies in Africa remain vulnerable in high-risk environments. And that is not to say security hasn't improved at our embassies. It has. Streets have been closed, additional guards have been positioned, barriers erected, and other defensive measures taken. But the age and location and set-back and quality of construction of many of these facilities makes them vulnerable until replaced and relocated in many cases.

I think the status quo is inexcusable. I think Congress ought to act, hopefully with the Administration, but, if necessary, without, to end this reality before more American blood is spilled.

Mr. Chairman, and Mr. Payne, and, colleagues, and, distinguished Members, I am grateful for the chance to be before you and to testify. And thank you very much for your interest and attention.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rice follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN E. RICE, CONSULTANT ON AFRICAN AFFAIRS
(FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE)

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Payne, distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today before your Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to return before you as a private citizen. I commend you for holding this timely hearing on a subject of critical importance.

Since September 11, I cannot count the number of people who have said to me, as I am sure they have said to you: "What a shame that Africa will now get fewer resources and zero attention in Washington." I certainly acknowledge the conventional wisdom underlying this sentiment. Moreover, I concede that, if past is prologue, this will likely be the case.

Yet, no outcome would be more shortsighted and indeed more dangerous—if we are not merely to fight but, ultimately, to win the global war on terror. We should not and we cannot condemn Africa to the far reaches of our global campaign. We should not and we cannot see Africa as separate from our comprehensive and long-term war against terror.

AFRICA: THE SOFT UNDER-BELLY

What has Africa got to do with al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, terrorist finance networks, even weapons of mass destruction? Unfortunately, everything. Africa is the world's soft under-belly for global terrorism.

As became painfully obvious even to casual observers after the bombings of our embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, terrorism directed against the United States is alive and well in Africa. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist cells are active throughout East, Southern and West Africa, not to mention in North Africa. These organizations hide throughout Africa. They plan, finance, train for and execute terrorist operations in many parts of Africa, not just Sudan and Somalia. They seek uranium, chemical weapons components and the knowledge of renegade nuclear, chemical and biological weapons experts from Libya to South Africa.

Terrorist organizations take advantage of Africa's porous borders, weak law enforcement and security services and nascent judicial institutions to move men, weapons and money around the globe. They take advantage of poor, disillusioned populations, often with religious or ethnic grievances, to recruit for their jihad against the civilized world.

Terrorist networks are exploiting Africa thoroughly and rapidly. In the process, they directly threaten our national security.

THE APPROPRIATE AMERICAN RESPONSE: TWO MISSING LINKS

What are we doing about it? Not nearly enough.

President Bush has, in my opinion, defined well the global nature of the threat we face and the necessity of a comprehensive, long-term response. He has rightly coupled the imperative of robust military action with energetic efforts to build an effective global coalition, to improve our intelligence collection, to seize the terrorists' assets, to defend the homeland, and to use the full weight of law enforcement in the U.S. and around the world to disrupt, apprehend and prosecute terrorists and their organizations.

But two critical pieces are missing from our comprehensive strategy. Both are defensive. One is shorter term. The other is long term.

First and most immediately, we must help those countries in Africa and elsewhere that have the will to cooperate with us in the war on terror but lack the means. It's not sufficient to say simply to the world: "you are either with us or against us." Or "we want action". There are plenty of countries that cannot act to defend their *own* citizens from terror, much less America's citizens. Recall that Kenya and Tanzania lost over two hundred of their own dead and suffered more than 5,000 casualties.

Recall too the difficulty the United States is having in defending our homeland from external and, perhaps, internal threats. And then, imagine how hard it must be for impoverished countries, with fragile or non-existent democratic institutions, deficient infrastructure, widespread corruption and great social distress to take the steps they must to protect their citizens and be effective partners for the U.S. in the war on terror.

I was pleased to hear President Bush say in his speech to the UN General Assembly that we would help such countries. But we do not seem yet to have in place a strategy to do so. And we certainly have not set aside the resources to implement such a strategy.

In the wake of the East Africa Embassy bombings, the Clinton Administration finalized the first ever continent-wide strategy to combat crime, terrorism and narcotics flows in Africa. We made available for the first time funds to establish the International Law Enforcement Academy for Southern Africa (ILEA). Africa received for the first time an annual share of the State Department's global anti-crime, counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism budgets. It was a start, but a modest start. And in the global battle we now face against terrorism, these resources are woefully inadequate.

It is imperative that we invest tens of millions of dollars annually in helping build counter-crime and counter-terrorism capacity in a large number of African countries. We must help them take the necessary steps to control their borders, improve intelligence collection, strengthen law enforcement and security services and build effective, transparent judicial institutions. We need to invest not only in big countries, like Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa, but over time throughout the continent, since the threat is continental in scope. From Cote D'Ivoire and Mauritania to Mozambique, from Zambia to Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Ethiopia, we must put our money where our mouths are. And we must begin to do so now.

Second, over the longer term, we have to drain the swamps where the terrorists breed. Many of these are in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. But many

are also in Africa today and, potentially, in the Caribbean and Latin America tomorrow. Islam is a large and fast growing religion in Africa. That in itself is not a concern. But the fact that some of Islam's most radical and anti-American adherents are increasingly active from South Africa to Sudan, from Nigeria to Algeria should be of great concern to us.

Much of Africa is a veritable incubator for the foot soldiers of terrorism. Its poor, overwhelmingly young, disaffected, unhealthy and under-educated populations often have no stake in government, no faith in the future and harbor an easily exploitable discontent with the status quo. For such people, in such places, nihilism is as natural a response to their circumstances as self-help. Violence and crime may be at least as attractive as hard work. Perhaps that is part of the reason why we have seen an increase in recent years in the number of African nationals engaged in international terrorism.

These are the swamps we must drain. We must do so for the cold, hard reason that to do otherwise, we place our national security at further and more permanent risk. We must do so not for liberal, humanitarian or moral reasons, but out of realpolitik recognition that our long-term security depends on it.

To drain these swamps, we must reduce this burgeoning hostility and address its sources. We must view it as our fight, not just the developing world's, to close the gaps between rich and poor. It must be our fight, not just Africa's, to educate the uneducated, prevent and treat infectious diseases especially HIV/AIDS, to increase trade, investment and growth, to fight corruption, as well as to bolster and strengthen democratic institutions. Without progress on these fronts throughout the developing world, we should expect bin Laden and future such enemies to find a growing constituency for their radical form of Islam, whose chief tenet is hatred of America and the civilized world.

Moreover, we must recognize that regimes lacking legitimacy and failed states are convenient safe havens as well as breeding grounds for terrorists. If we are serious about our anti-terrorism commitment, whether we like it or not, the U.S. must become more rather than less engaged in the difficult tasks of peacemaking, peacekeeping and national reconstruction—from the Great Lakes to Sierra Leone, from Liberia to Sudan and Somalia. We must also find effective ways to secure Africa's vast natural resources—its diamonds, cobalt, uranium, oil, timber, coltan, its gold—so they do not provide currency for the world's terrorists.

Fighting these battles will not be swift or cheap. America, leading our partners in the developed world, both in the public and private sectors, will have to invest on a scale previously inconceivable, if we are to defend ourselves against this pervasive threat. We will have to open our markets completely to goods and services from the developing world, provide much more trade and investment financing, bridge the digital divide, increase assistance for education (especially for girls), build necessary health infrastructure and treat the infected, invest greater resources in debt relief and in finding a vaccine for HIV/AIDs. And we must do more to help professionalize Africa's militaries.

In short, we will have to pay the price, billions and billions, to help lift the peoples of Africa and other under-developed regions out of poverty and hopelessness. If we do not, we will reap the harvest of a disaffected generation's hostility and growing anti-Americanism—from the Middle East to Central and South Asia and, indeed, to Africa.

It goes without saying that the United States cannot do this alone. Nor could together all the developed countries on earth. African peoples and African governments will have to provide the leadership, the transparency, the will, and the commitment to forge a better future. Without this, all well-intentioned efforts will fail.

But with mutual commitment and serious, sustained investment, we can achieve mutual security and, eventually, even mutual prosperity.

Unfortunately, these are by necessity budget-busting times. It's not enough to ramp up spending, as we are and we must, for defense and intelligence. We must also dramatically increase resources in the Foreign Operations accounts to help would-be partners in Africa and elsewhere in the world fight with us side-by-side in the war on terror.

The Foreign Operations budget is all but final and, regrettably, it is business as usual—almost a straight-line appropriation. At the end of the day, Pakistan will get supplemental resources and therefore fare better than last year, but much of the rest of the world will not. And Africa, after several years of progressively increasing resources under President Clinton, will predictably and shortsightedly, get less than last year.

Now is the time to reverse that trend. We cannot realistically hope to win a truly comprehensive, global war on terrorism without substantial additional Foreign Operations resources. If we are going to fight this war big, we must also fight it smart.

ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES

We must also deal with the unique challenges posed by two of Africa's most troublesome countries: Sudan and Somalia.

Sudan has been an active and aggressive state sponsor of terrorism. It has been for many years the only country in Sub-Saharan Africa that poses a direct threat to U.S. national security. As evidenced by this week's bombing by GOS forces of a WFP food distribution center in the Nuba Mountains, Sudan continues to be one of the worst abusers of human rights on the planet. They support the enslavement of their own citizens, bomb regularly innocent civilians, persecute people for their religious beliefs and prosecute one of the deadliest and long-standing wars on earth. Sudan is also notorious for saying one thing and doing quite another.

But suddenly and rapidly in the wake of September 11, according to Administration officials, Sudan has begun meaningful cooperation with the U.S. on terrorism. Good. Fear, in this case of more American military strikes, can be a great motivator. But can it be a converter? Time will tell.

If Sudan indeed provides meaningful, comprehensive and sustained cooperation to the United States in the war on terrorism, we ought to acknowledge it. We cannot forget Sudan's past role in plots to destroy American people and interests, but we can seize all valuable assistance in our current battle.

Yet given its recent past, Sudan still has a long way to go if it is to become a credible member in good standing of the global coalition against terrorism. To achieve such standing, Sudan must detain, offer for interrogation and, if requested, render to the U.S. or responsible partners all suspected terrorists within its borders. Sudan must share all intelligence on terrorist networks and activities, past and present. It must freeze the assets and shut down the businesses, NGOs and charities that provide financial life-lines to all U.S.-designated terrorist organizations active in Sudan, not just Al-Qaeda. Sudan must close down all terrorist training camps and allow them to be inspected on a random basis. It must crack down on the loose issuance of entry visas and abuse of its passports. And Sudan must halt the mobilization for war in the South on the basis of "jihad."

If Sudan falls short on any of these key criteria, it should be reminded of President Bush's promise to go after unreconstructed state sponsors of terrorism the way we have gone after the Taliban. Let us not forget that, in the current context, Sudan needs to cooperate with us more than we need its cooperation.

Moreover, and very importantly, we need to separate the issues of potential Sudanese cooperation on terrorism from our longstanding objections to Sudan's human rights abuses, its brutal prosecution of the civil war, its use of humanitarian assistance as a weapon of war, and its efforts to destabilize neighboring states. The Administration must continue to make plain to Sudan that cooperation on terrorism will not afford it a "get out of jail free" card on *any* other issue. We ought to maintain, and if possible, increase the pressure on Sudan to change fundamentally its behavior. We ought not to lift our bilateral sanctions or alter the fundamentals of our bilateral relationship until Sudan demonstrates a conversion in deeds, not just words.

Somalia has been America's Achilles heel in Africa for almost a decade and remains so. It is hardly any closer to coherent and unified national government than it was when the UN withdrew in 1995. Somalia has become the continent's proverbial black hole: an ungoverned, lawless, radicalized, heavily armed country with one of the longest undefended coastlines in the region. It is terrorist heaven.

Worse still, no one I am aware of, either in the U.S., the UN, the region or elsewhere, has a good idea of what to do about it. Certainly, there is no consensus on what the policy objective ought to be, much less how to fulfill it. Somalia may again now be the greatest policy challenge we face in Africa. It is one that successive American administrations, the previous one included, have preferred to ignore. We no longer have that luxury, if we ever did, as we fight the global war on terror.

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

Public Diplomacy. We must employ all our wits and substantial resources to fight and win the public diplomacy battle in Africa, as we must elsewhere in the world. Too many men and women on the streets of Africa believe the lie that we are anti-Islam and anti-Arab. Too many view our war of self-defense in Afghanistan as an effort to starve and kill innocent civilians. We have to combat these dangerous perceptions aggressively, not just in the Middle East and South Asia, but around the world. The Administration, with our British allies, has taken some important recent steps to engage this battle of public perceptions. As they do so, it is critical that African public opinion be viewed both as a target and a resource.

Embassy Security. Finally, despite the shock and the robust U.S. response to the Embassy bombings in 1998, we have yet to take all the necessary steps to secure our personnel and our embassies in Africa. Secretaries Albright and Powell both sought and have received more resources for embassy security. But three years later, we have completed construction of only one new embassy facility in Africa. Three years later, at least three quarters of our African embassies remain vulnerable in high-risk environments. That is not to say that security around our facilities has not been enhanced. It has. Streets have been closed, additional guards positioned, barriers erected, other defensive measures taken. But the age, location, setback and quality of construction of many of these facilities makes them vulnerable until replaced and, often relocated. The status quo is inexcusable, and Congress ought to act, with or without the Administration, to end this travesty before more American blood is spilled.

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your interest and attention. I am grateful to you and Congressman Payne for the opportunity to appear before you. I trust that with your continued strong leadership, and the sustained energy and attention of this Administration, we will chart the right course in Africa during these uncertain times.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Rice. I will forward to Special Envoy Danforth your notes specifically on Sudan. Thank you——

Ms. RICE. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. For your testimony today. Dr. Morrison.

STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and, Mr. Payne, for the opportunity to come and be here today with you on this very important subject. I will simply summarize some of the main points within my paper. I realize time is short.

Africa presents five principle challenges or flashpoints with respect to terrorist networks, if we are looking at the linkage between global terrorist networks and threats to U.S. interests within Africa.

First, I would say, al-Qaeda elements and sympathizers have linkages into central and southern Somalia. They have operated in a league with the Somalia Islamist movement, Al-Itihaad. They could enhance those linkages. We could see more movement there. That could invite a strong United States military response, already is inviting, and has, in the past, triggered military responses from Ethiopia.

Second, there is a risk of a violent anti-U.S. reaction in northern Sudan. This is a comment that, I think, simply complements some of what Susan has described. There is an ongoing U.S.-Sudan dialogue on terrorism. There is an active effort by former Senator Danforth to test prospects for renewed peace process within Sudan. Many of the same measures that Susan has outlined are part of that ongoing testing process. I think we need to understand that there is residual linkages to, and sympathies to, al-Qaeda, and those could be aggravated or deliberately manipulated to act against U.S. interests there.

Third, al-Qaeda's influence could expand in northern Nigeria and contribute possibly to a violent anti-U.S. reaction there. There is plenty of evidence already on the table that could create a crisis

of governance for President Obasanjo. It could strain U.S.-Nigerian relations.

A fourth threat is in South Africa. There are al-Qaeda cells in Cape Town and Durban. There have been violent actions emanating from those. You could see an acceleration. It could test the mettle of President Mbeki. It could test the shape of U.S.-South African relations.

The fifth point pertains to West Africa to illicit diamond trafficking. There we see a confluence of Libya's Quaddafi, the Sierra Leone outlawed insurgency, the RUF, the Revolutionary United Front, Burkina Faso President Campaore, and Liberian President Charles Taylor. We could—this is a set of relations which is being used for money laundering purposes for al-Qaeda. It has been treated in the press.

So those are the fifth major—the five principal challenges. I will—and my paper goes into some detail on each of those areas. What I would like to do is skip ahead and speak to the—to two points. One is, the ambivalence that exists within Africa toward the United States and its anti-terrorist global campaign. And then what I see as six actions that the Administration—which are affordable, which the Administration could take in putting together a more comprehensive and assertive counter-terrorist strategy.

The reaction within Africa was quite muted and quite ambivalent to the events of September 11. It is a response to fear, fear that a U.S. military campaign might harm Muslim civilians and outrage domestic constituencies. A fear that it might invite further attacks on U.S. facilities in Africa, which have taken high causalities among the Africans, that would kill and wound many Africans, and a fear that reminiscent of the Gulf War a decade earlier, that it will set back the continent economically and that it will lead to significant cuts in international development assistance. Memories of that period are still very live.

There is a also a skepticism of U.S. commitments to Africa, and that skepticism has resurfaced in significant new ways that links back to actions taken with respect to Somalia in '93, '94, Rwanda, '94, and the like. And we have seen some hot spots within Africa where there has been violent anti-U.S. reaction in Kano, in Khartoum, in coastal Kenya.

Now, set against that was the reaction by strong friends of the United States to very vocally and assertively demonstrate resolve in support of the United States—Senegalese President Wade, Nigerian President Obasanjo, expressions that came from South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Angola, among others. This culminated in the mid-October Dakar Summit.

One point I want to make here is that I believe that these friends of the United States, who have projected themselves in this fashion, are sincere in their expressions. They are also very concerned that the effort that they lead through the New Africa Initiative that was adopted by the Organization of African Unity and praised by the G8 Summit in Italy in the summer, is at risk that this new African partnership, in which these reformist states are seeking a new compact with the west in support of political and economic reforms. That it will be eclipsed, that it will be overlooked, that the promise of increased external development and financial flows from

the west, along with expanded debt relief and trade and investment opportunities to support real political and economic reform, will be damaged. The reason I highlight this is I think that that compact, that reciprocity, that implicit quid pro quo, that exists within Africa, is central to any effective counter-terrorist strategy, vis-a-vis Africa.

Where do we go from here? I think we need to keep in mind that oil matters very significantly to Africa—to the United States, oil from Africa. It will matter even more now as we look for new non-Gulf sources. There is $40 billion in new American investment on the table in the energy sector in Africa for the next few years. We derive 17 percent of our oil from Africa, 80 percent of American trade and investment. This is a zone which will get much greater attention, particularly with respect to Nigeria and Angola. We don't have an energy policy. We don't have a policy that looks toward supporting—curb corruption, developmental benefits, respect of human rights, and resolution of long-standing internal armed conflicts in this zone.

The second point I want to make reinforces something that Susan, quite eloquently, expressed, which is our diplomatic and intelligence capacities in Africa have been sorely depleted over the past decade. In the aftermath of September 11, resources—human and financial resources have been diverted on a very significant scale.

Today we have very, very weak insight into northern Sudan, northern Nigeria, and central and southern Somalia, three of the critical areas that I outlined where threats are emanating into our interests. This creates real vulnerabilities for Americans. The bombings of Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 1998 were, in some respects, a significant human and intelligence failure. We need more secure embassies. We need stronger human and diplomatic intelligence assets and capacities.

We should take six steps. One is, we should bring our existing policy priorities to scale. In some respects, we are doing the right thing along a number of different fronts. If you look at what we are doing with respect to the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act, which the Chairman referenced, if we look at debt-relief facilities, if we look at our enlarging commitment on HIV/AIDS, if we look at efforts to restore the development assistance account, which Susan led in the late Clinton Administration, if we look at the heightened focus upon the energy sector—all of these are very valid bases for strengthening Africa. They are now part of the focus of the New Africa Initiative. What is missing, however, is defending and protecting these efforts against raiding, in the context of the crisis in Afghanistan, and enhancing them as our contribution to support of the New Africa Initiative.

The second point is we should reach beyond official contacts to Africa's citizens. We have a strong need for a public diplomacy strategy to reach Africa's Muslim communities. We have instruments like the Horn of Africa Service at VOA that could be greatly enhanced to bring across straight journalism, straight accounts, of what is happening on the ground and what U.S. policy represents. At a popular non-governmental level we should expect that we will encounter heightened skepticism to U.S. actions on counter-ter-

rorism, and we need to bring forward, particularly in Sudan, in the Horn, other parts of the Horn, in Nigeria, and South Africa, what U.S. policies are.

Second, we need a feasible and integrated Horn of Africa strategy. The sorts of concerns on Sudan that Susan outlined, the initiatives by Senator Danforth—those are key elements. We also need a strategy that defines how we are going to relate to Kenya and Ethiopia in coping with the threat within central and southern Somalia. The Horn of Africa is at a much more fragile point today than it was earlier.

We need to bring our anti-terrorism concerns into our bilateral dialogue with South Africa and with Nigeria. That will be a sensitive and complex challenge. We need to upgrade our U.S. human and institutional capacities. And we need a feasible U.S. security assistance strategy for counter-terrorism.

Mr. Chairman, I realize time is short. I think these measures that we have proposed are affordable, the ones that Susan has outlined and the ones that are contained within my paper. They are complimentary. They are consistent with one another, and they are affordable if there is sufficient will at a high level. And if they are brought forward through early systematic consultations in Africa. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Morrison follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. STEPHEN MORRISON, PH.D., DIRECTOR, AFRICA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

I wish to commend Chairman Royce, Congressman Payne, and other Members for focusing today on a critical challenge now before Washington: how to reorient U.S. policies to address global terrorist threats that link to Africa—at the same time that the United States strengthens its other key interests in Africa in promoting democracy, the rule of law, resolution of chronic and multiple wars, and integration into the global economy.

Africa today matters, for good and bad, far more to U.S. interests than it did pre-September 11. The outstanding policy question is what the Bush administration is prepared to do to meet this historic challenge—with what level of sustained political will and essential resources. Several affordable measures can be undertaken right away that can attract bipartisan support from Congress and support from serious African reformers. Under funded half-measures, on the other hand, will have little positive effect and only weaken U.S. credibility.

THE TERRORIST THREAT IN AFRICA

Fully one third of Africa's 700 million citizens are Muslim, and for the vast majority radical Islam has had minimal resonance. Africa is replete with enduring traditions of tolerance among Muslim and non-Muslim communities, while the U.S. has successfully developed close friendly relations with a range of African states with substantial Muslim populations. Nonetheless, most of Africa's Muslims, like their non-Muslim African brethren, are impoverished global have-nots who live in acute—and worsening—marginality that invites local sectarian and interethnic strife, despair and anti-Western resentment.

During the past decade, frustrated Muslims living under corrupt, malfunctioning governments across the Horn, West Africa's Sahel zone and areas of southern Africa have looked increasingly to Islamic agencies funded by Saudi and other Persian Gulf donors to provide education, health, social welfare, and security. This weakly understood phenomenon has often stabilized communities and enhanced the local legitimacy of Muslim social activism. At the same time, it has provided the means to mobilize anti-U.S. and anti-Western sentiment and has created havens for militant actors who endeavor to act in solidarity with Al Qaeda. From the outside, differentiating among legitimate social welfare action, rhetorical posturing, and support for international terrorism is a formidable challenge.

As the campaign against global terrorism unfolds, several flashpoints in Africa will merit special attention. First, Al Qaeda elements and sympathizers may seek

refuge in central or northern Somalia, in league with Al-Itihaad, and with possible linkages to ethnic Somali communities in Kenya. That could invite a strong U.S. military response into Somalia and possibly new cross-border interventions by Ethiopia. Second, there is a risk of a violent anti-U.S. reaction in northern Sudan that could derail the ongoing U.S.-Sudan dialogue on terrorism and prospects for renewed negotiations to achieve a just, comprehensive peace settlement to Sudan's internal war. Third, Al Qaeda's influence could expand in northern Nigeria, possibly contribute to a violent anti-U.S. reaction there, and potentially create a crisis of governance for President Obasanjo. A fourth threat, perhaps more modest than the others, is a terrorist assault upon U.S. interests and others in Cape Town and Durban that would test the mettle of President Mbeki and reshape the contour of U.S.-South African relations. Finally, Al Qaeda could seek to strengthen its underground linkages to West African illicit diamond trafficking, based on direct and indirect partnerships with Quaddafi, the RUF, Campaore and Taylor.

The most serious and complex challenges lie in the Horn of Africa

SUDAN

Sudan is one of seven countries on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism and since 1989 has been a self-proclaimed Islamic republic. Twelve years hence, its Islamic revolution is exhausted and widely discredited, internally and externally. From 1991 until early 1996, Khartoum provided a home to Osama bin Laden; it may still provide a haven to members of the Al Qaeda network. Reportedly, Al Qaeda business linkages persist in the banking sector and export-import and agricultural commodity enterprises. Al Qaeda enjoys an unknown level of popular support within northern Sudanese society. The radical Islamist leader, Hassan Turabi, who sought for himself and the National Islamic Front government a leading international role on behalf of political Islam, has been detained for most of 2001, and demonstrations of support in northern Sudan on his behalf have been modest but persistent.

Since first moving against Turabi at the end of 2000, President Umar Al-Bashir has attempted to moderate his external image and rehabilitate his external linkages. Internally, he has persistently pursued a hard-line Islamist rhetoric against his opponents, shown no proof of willingness to pursue a negotiated peace settlement to Sudan's eighteen-year internal war, and persisted in aerial bombardments of civilian humanitarian sites in southern opposition areas and egregious human rights abuses.

Sudan swiftly became a priority focus of U.S. investigators immediately after September 11. Sudanese President Umar Al-Bashir announced that Sudan had broken all its links to bin Laden, and would cooperate fully in identifying those responsible for the attacks. According to U.S. officials, Sudan responded cooperatively "across the board" to U.S. requests for specific information and actions, making an "implicit" offer of access to military bases and overflight rights, and providing names and locations of individuals in the Al Qaeda network, as well as access to Sudan's banking system.

Khartoum's newfound willingness to cooperate has drawn an overt acknowledgment from Secretary of State Colin Powell and other U.S. officials. Senior House Republicans, under pressure from the White House, have postponed indefinitely debate on the Sudan Peace Act, a bill that would have bolstered support to the southern rebels in Sudan and punished foreign companies doing business in the country. And, on September 28, the United States acquiesced to a UN Security Council decision to lift sanctions on Sudan, imposed in April 1996 after an assassination attempt on Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.

Nonetheless, these developments represent only the opening phase of a new and urgent U.S.-Sudan dialogue on terrorism. The United States will almost certainly push for further measures, including expanded efforts to identify and renounce all remaining terrorist ties, a willingness to ship known terrorists abroad to face justice, and enduring cooperation in international intelligence and law enforcement efforts. Beyond terrorism, it will be critically important that Washington not ease pressure on Khartoum to improve its deplorable human rights record, enhance humanitarian access, cease aerial bombardment of civilian sites, and return in earnest to the negotiating table to seek a just peace settlement to Sudan's war. There is a clear risk that Khartoum may conclude that cooperation on international terrorist issues has won it space on internal war issues, and that Washington will be distracted by other, more pressing matters in South Asia.

SOMALIA

Al-Itihaad, the radical Islamist movement assembled out of mujahhedin veterans, operates in the stateless space of central Somalia, in the midst of other Muslim charities that enjoy considerable popular legitimacy for the social welfare they have created. Supported by wealthy Saudi elements, Al-Itihaad has strong ties to ethnic Somalis inside Kenya (especially Eastleigh, near Nairobi, and within Kenya's coastal Muslim community) and is alleged to have been closely associated with violent Al Qaeda operations against U.S. personnel. In 1993, Bin Laden provided training support to the Somali warlord Mohamed Farah Aideed, whose forces on October 3, 1993 killed 18 American commandos. *The Washington Post* reported on November 4 that following the U.S. withdrawal from Somalia in 1994, "al Qaeda members continued to use Somalia as a regional base of operations, including preparations for the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania." Those attacks killed 12 Americans and 245 Africans and seriously injured over 4,000 persons (the vast majority Kenyan.)

In the early to mid-1990s, Al-Itihaad dominated the port of Merca and the inland center of Luuq. At its peak, it has been able to muster upwards of 3,000 armed fighters, has staged terrorist operations in Ethiopia and Kenya, and coordinated activities with terrorist entities operating out of Khartoum. Its power and personnel have declined significantly at each of the three points during the past five years when Ethiopian forces have intervened massively inside Somalia. At present, Al-Itihaad reportedly has a base of operations on Ras Kamboni Island in southern Somalia, which is used by Al Qaeda for transit of materials and personnel. According to official Ethiopian and other sources, Al-Itihaad has also made inroads into northeastern Somalia, in the semi-autonomous region Puntland, and through its port, Bosaso, has sent volunteers to support Al Qaeda operations in Afghanistan.

Al-Itihaad was named in September 2001 by the Bush administration as one of the 27 entities supporting Al Qaeda. On November 7, the Bush administration took action to shut down the Al Barakaat hawala financial network, whose operations are centered in Somalia and which is accused of funding Al Qaeda's activities.

NIGERIA

Nigeria, where fifty percent of the 120 million citizens are Muslim, could see a deepening rift along ethno-religious lines. In the twelve self-proclaimed Islamic states of northern Nigeria, authority rests with governors linked to the northern military power base that plundered Nigeria under Sani Abacha and saw its influence collapse, much to its surprise, with Obasanjo's electoral triumph in 1999. These governors have successfully consolidated their position through an aggressive critique of Obasanjo's failure to curb corruption and decentralize authority, combined with his close alliance with the West. There is a great deal of favorable sentiment toward Al Qaeda in the north, and easy, unregulated flows of finance, people and commodities linked to external Islamic networks.

SOUTH AFRICA

Al Qaeda cells exist in Cape Town and Durban. Al Qaeda has been affiliated with two Cape Town movements, People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (Pagad) and its associate, Qibla. Pagad launched a bombing campaign in Cape Town in 1998 that included American targets. Both Pagad and Qibla are on the official U.S. list of terrorist organizations. Though only an estimated two percent of South Africa's population is Muslim, that figure is growing, as proselytizing efforts reach beyond the Asian population to the mixed race and black African communities. The South African government has been too ill-informed, and ill equipped, to bring effective controls upon radical Islam within its borders.

LIBYA AND ILLICIT DIAMONDS

Libya's Quaddafi has a history of terrorist activities in Africa that has been in remission in recent years, at the same time that he has launched an expansive campaign to win political allegiances across Africa. More recently, however, credible reports have surfaced that Quaddafi is linked to illicit diamond trafficking out of Sierra Leone that directly benefits Al Qaeda, along with Liberian President Charles Taylor, the outlawed Sierra Leone insurgency, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the President of Burkina Faso, Blaise Campaore.

AFRICA'S APPREHENSIVE FRIENDS AND SKEPTICS

Though in the immediate aftermath of September 11, many African leaders expressed heartfelt sympathies and condolences, the reaction in many African states

was strikingly muted and ambivalent. Some feared that the inexorable American military campaign might harm Muslim civilians (and outrage domestic constituencies), invite further attacks on U.S. facilities in Africa that would wound and kill many Africans, and, reminiscent of the Gulf War a decade earlier, set back the continent economically, and trigger cuts in international development assistance.

The toned-down reaction also reflected a skepticism of America, if not outright anti-Americanism in some corners, that follows from America's swift disengagement in 1993–1994 from Somalia and passivity in early 1994 in the face of the Rwanda genocide; a perception of U.S. detachment from Africa's profound needs (many in Africa continue to argue that the Bush administration is woefully indifferent to Africa, contrary indications notwithstanding); and the United States' perceived bias in favor of Israel in the Middle East crisis. As U.S. military action commenced in early October, virulent anti-U.S. sentiment surfaced in select hotspots—including Muslim cleric leaders in coastal Kenya, religious leaders and official media in Khartoum, and rioters in Kano in northern Nigeria who played upon pre-existing, acute sectarian tensions, and whose violence quickly left more than 120 dead and threatened to spread to several major urban centers.

A notable exception to Africa's muted response was the reaction of a small set of powerful African leaders with comparatively strong, established ties to the United States. Nigerian President Olesegun Obasanjo swiftly backed U.S. and British operations against Al Qaeda and the Taliban regime. South Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Angola, among others, soon followed, with frequent emphasis on the need for hard evidence and targeted retaliation. Interestingly, though, when Wade hosted a summit in Dakar in mid-October, the results fell far short of his original ambitions and reaffirmed Africa's fundamental hesitation to identify too overtly with the United States' anti-terrorism campaign. Only ten African heads of state appeared (of whom the majority did not represent regional powers). Instead of endorsing a major new pact on terrorism, participants temporized—issuing a declaration calling for a meeting of the Organization of Africa Unity (soon to be transformed into the African Union) to monitor developments and evaluate implementation of the existing African Convention against Terrorism. That desultory initiative was adopted in 1999 following the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, signed by 36 of Africa's 53 states, and subsequently ratified by only three.

Wade and others' hope for a fresh African pact that expressly aided the U.S. campaign was prompted in part by fear that the emerging war in Afghanistan would lay waste to their New African Initiative (NAI), adopted by the Organization of African Unity and praised by the G8 summit in Italy in July 2001. The NAI seeks a "new global partnership" to end Africa's marginal position in the world economy, spur trade and reduce poverty. African political and economic reforms would be reciprocated by increased external developmental and financial flows from the West, along with expanded debt relief and trade and investment opportunities.

THE ROAD AHEAD

Post-September 11, Africa matters to U.S. interests in significant new ways, both good and bad. There is now greater recognition in the United States that Africa's institutional weaknesses, autocratic governance and economic marginality pose a serious threat to U.S. security interests. In the near to medium term, these vexin g factors are only expected to worsen; in the midst of a global economic downturn aggravated by the aftermath of September 11, the World Bank predicts the worst impact will be felt in Africa. Africa's exceptional circumstances give rise to porous borders, places to hide, opportunity for bribery, and a ready, aggrieved audience, all of which could significantly benefit the next emergent, terrorist network seeking advantage in Africa. Openings already exist in Sudan, Somalia, northern Nigeria and South Africa—which must be addressed systematically. Other openings could appear in several other African settings and quickly merit priority attention.

At the same time, an important subset of Africa's leaders appears genuinely ready to work with the United States in the battle against international terrorism. Their commitment is linked—in a direct and timely way—to their quest to reverse Africa's decline through new reciprocal partnerships with Western powers. If managed carefully and aggressively, so that credible new U.S. commitments are put in place, *and* if African partners show tangible progress in economic and political reform, including respect for human rights, the United States may realize real gains in the next five years, and consolidate ties with an enduring, core African coalition. Where this opportunity is mishandled, the United States could easily find itself in intimate alliances—reminiscent of the Cold War—with unsavory, and ultimately unreliable partners.

Two additional factors enter the equation, post-September 11.

There is greater recognition that Africa matters to the United States as an important and growing source of non-Gulf oil: currently the central/west African basin accounts for 17% of U.S. oil imports and over 80% of American trade and investment in Africa. Plans exist for an estimated $40 billion in new U.S. private investment in the energy sector in Africa in the next few years, when production and imports in and from this region are expected to rise steadily. This factor has its most powerful impact on U.S. bilateral ties with Nigeria and Angola; in these two instances, future debate over U.S. policy will continue to center on the best means to curb corruption, promote tolerance, broaden developmental benefits from oil, respect human rights, and resolve longstanding internal armed conflicts. The challenge will be balancing U.S. policy on the difficult internal reforms required of Nigeria and Angola with short term goals of securing new oil flows and expressions of political allegiance.

Second, U.S. diplomatic and intelligence capacities in Africa have been steadily depleted over the past decade, and indeed have been further degraded since September 11, as substantial personnel and resources have been diverted. Diplomatic personnel dedicated to Africa were slashed by 15 percent in the mid-1990s, at the same time that intelligence personnel were cut back over a third, and fully a dozen aid missions were shuttered. These developments predictably translate into a weakened grasp of quickly evolving trends on the ground (the U.S. currently has at best weak insight into northern Sudan, northern Nigeria, and central and southern Somalia), and create acute vulnerabilities that can be brutally exploited—as was seen in the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi. As the U.S.-led war against terrorism unfolds, U.S. citizens and embassies, along with innocent Africans, could easily be the targets of new violence.

Looking ahead, six actions will be critical to an effective U.S. counter terrorism policy in and with Africa.

1) Bring existing priority initiatives to scale.

A top priority should be to demonstrate U.S. resolve in bringing multiple enhanced benefits to those states that are both reliable anti-terrorist partners and credible economic and political reformers. That will mean protecting existing programs from abrupt depletions to support non-African programs—'raiding' that has already begun within the Bush administration. That will mean overt, strong U.S. diplomatic leadership to support the New Africa Initiative. It will also mean deepening and broadening the trade and investment opportunities of the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA); increasing debt relief and facilities through the IMF and World Bank; steadily enlarging U.S. commitments to battle HIV/AIDS, so that they surpass $1 billion within a year, and otherwise doubling bilateral assistance in support of economic growth, conflict reconciliation and rule of law. It means elaborating a serious energy strategy for Africa that focuses upon building management capacity, transparency and accountability, power generation and regional integration of energy grids. It is less important, post-September 11, that the United States embarks on wholly new initiatives than that it protect and bring to scale existing policy priorities that require substantially higher commitments to be effective, and to earn credibility and leverage in Africa.

2) Reach beyond official contacts to Africa's citizens.

The U.S. needs a smart public diplomacy that systematically builds ties with Muslim communities, and more generally, with civic organizations, opposition leaders, religious authorities and human rights advocates. At a popular and non-governmental level, Washington should expect that its heightened counter-terrorist actions U.S. will frequently be met in Africa with intense skepticism, if not outright hostility: that it is anti-Islam in its motivations; that it relies on close ties with autocratic regimes; and that it will not be sustained. Special efforts should be made in northern Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, northern Nigeria, and South Africa.

3) Define a feasible, integrated Horn of Africa strategy.

A related, second priority will be to elaborate a Horn of Africa strategy that consolidates recent gains in bilateral terrorism cooperation with Khartoum; effectively contains and reduces Al-Itihaad's influence in central and southern Somalia; clarifies strategy vis-a-vis the Somaliland government in northern Somalia and the fledgling Transitional National Government in Mogadishu; and spells out how the United States will pursue—versus compromise—its enduring interests in democracy, respect for human rights, economic reform and just peace settlements to the region's internal wars.

The latter considerations will be especially important in the U.S. strategy to end Sudan's eighteen-year war and U.S. relations with regional partners such as Kenya and Ethiopia. As Ethiopia and Kenya inevitably turn to the United States for new

forms of security cooperation to address threats in Somalia (and perhaps also assist with ending Sudan's war), the United States should have a medium-term strategy ready at hand. Washington should not desist, for example, from pressing aggressively for curbs on Kenyan governmental corruption and for an orderly and transparent national electoral transition into the post-Moi future. Nor should it shy away from engaging Addis Ababa on full implementation of the Algiers peace accord (ending Ethiopia's interstate war with Eritrea), and genuine democratic and economic liberalization. At all points, Washington will need discipline and caution, in dealing with the threat of instability in Asmara and Addis Ababa, breakdown of the Algiers Accord, and realism in judging what Kenya and Ethiopia are capable of delivering in their dangerous neighborhoods.

A key element to the U.S. Horn strategy will be accelerating administration efforts, led by former Senator John Danforth, to bring the Saudis, Egypt, Kenya and key Europeans behind a concerted multilateral effort to achieve a just, negotiated peace settlement to Sudan's internal war. The United States should also expedite the restaffing of the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum (suspended since early 1996).

4) Bring antiterrorism into the bilateral dialogue with South Africa and Nigeria.

Corruption and sectarian violence in Nigeria, along with uncontrolled movement of people, goods and finances into the north, remain complex, volatile issues. The same can be said for Pagad and Qibla—two anti-government, anti-Western organizations in South Africa. These are subjects which U.S. diplomacy will have to approach gingerly and flexibly, and where new forms of outreach and leverage will be essential. As in the case of the Horn of Africa, a challenge will be to integrate this new dimension of U.S. foreign policy with pre-existing priorities.

5) Upgrade U.S. human and institutional capacities.

A fourth priority is bolstering U.S. human capital and resources—strengthening significantly U.S. intelligence, diplomatic and foreign assistance personnel in the Horn and West Africa, the latter with special reference to northern Nigeria. Much more effort will be needed also to understand Quaddafi's expansive policies in Africa. Overall, this effort will require a multi-year strategy to recruit and train additional career personnel.

6) Define a feasible U.S. security assistance strategy for counter-terrorism.

Fifth, the Bush administration should accelerate its review of U.S. security assistance to Africa—for example, the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), and Operation Focused Relief—to reconfigure these programs to strengthen military counterterrorist capacities in Kenya, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa. It should step up support to regional arms control initiatives and the international campaign to tighten illicit diamond flows (the "Kimberley process") and secure new, substantial nonmilitary assistance to strengthen border controls, law enforcement and financial controls. Substantial increases in flexible Economic Support Funds (ESF) will be essential: $300 million per year.

CONCLUSION

These proposed measures can all be undertaken at an affordable cost, if there is sufficient political will at a high level. All can muster bipartisan support from Congress, if the administration extends itself in a concerted fashion. All can win support in Africa where support matters, if U.S. policies meaningfully and powerfully answer the needs of serious African reformers, and if they are accompanied by systematic, early consultations. If attempted on the cheap, these measures will be a formula for policy failure and erosion of U.S. credibility.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Dr. Morrison. And we are going to now go to Dr. Nyang. In the meantime, as you can tell, there is a series of votes, and so myself and Ranking Member Congressman Payne will be trading off here. Thank you. Dr. Nyang.

STATEMENT OF SULAYMAN S. NYANG, PH.D., PROFESSOR, AFRICAN STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

Mr. NYANG. Yes. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, and Congressman Payne, and, staff. It is a pleasure to be here. And what I am going to do really is to give some historical background, because, I think, in order for us to understand the present state of

affairs in Africa, we have to really understand the conditions and circumstances which created the problem we are now dealing with.

The link—and I am going to read a portion of my testimony for the record. The linkage between terrorism and African societies can be traced back to the anti-colonial struggle. The Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya and the atrocities associated with it were generally characterized by the British authorities as acts of terrorism carried out by what was then perceived to be a predominately Kikuyu movement. The other instance of political violence that received the name terrorism was the Algerian uprising against French rule. This bloody uprising led to the death of thousands of Algerians and Frenchmen.

Yet, until the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana, Cuba, sub-Sahara Africa did not witness any major forms of political violence one can now, retrospectively, call terrorism. Up until the Havana conference, which declared the justifiability of violence in waging wars of national liberation, the African liberation movements took the path of nonviolence to fight for political independence. This change of rhetoric and tactics in the prosecution of the national liberation in the former Portuguese territories and in the former settler states of South Africa and Rhodesia, would create the precedent for the employment of low-level terrorism in these parts of the African continent. Although many system challengers of that period would now claim their acts to be those of freedom fighters against oppressive regimes, their acts were perceived in most Western circles as acts—violent acts of terrorism. These sentiments would affect the policies and decisions of the United States Government until the collapse of apartheid and the rise to power of the ANC National Congress.

And I think this is very important to understand because of the ambiguity that Stephen was mentioning with regard to some of these African governments. Because many of them came out of that kind of background.

It is against this background that we now examine the rise of militant Islam in Africa. Before we go into any serious analysis of the potential threat of Islamic militants to the United States of America, we must first identify the factors and forces responsible for the development of Islamic militancy in Africa.

Before the collapse of the colonial orders in Africa, African Muslims were becoming increasingly secularized. This process of secularization was a global phenomenon and scholars like American social scientist Daniel Lerner saw it as the passing of traditional society. This transition from a traditional society dominated by Islam to another on the verge of modernization, was widely celebrated by the champions of African and Arab nationalism. This was the heyday of African and Arab nationalism on the one hand and African and Arab socialism on the other. Taking place within the framework of the Cold War, this secularization process put Islam and religion generally on the defensive.

In the special case of Africa, the only defenders of Islam were the traditional conservative members of the Ulema—these are the learned scholars—and the sufi orders committed to Islamic mysticism, tassawuf. Because the young people were sold on the ideas of development and modernization, Islam continued to be observed

ritually but its political potency remained either underestimated or ignored completely by the political class and scholars. Three global and regional African developments would change the course of African and world history. The present state of Islamic militancy and terrorism in Africa and the world could be traced back to these changes in the international system.

The first development was the export into Africa of the political troubles of the Middle East. But before we go into the analysis of this development, let me remind my readers and audience here that the Middle East of the Cold War era was different from all other regions of the world because of the trinity of conflicts raging within its borders. The trinity of conflicts raging in the Middle East consists of the following: One, the bipolar Cold War between the United States of America and her allies and the Soviet Union and her Eastern Bloc allies; two, the Arab-Israeli conflict; three, the Arab Cold War.

To understand the present state of affairs regarding Islamic militancy and terrorism in Africa and the potential for terrorism in Muslim lands and among Muslim minorities in African societies, one must first examine how the African Muslims became involved in the theater of conflicts in the Middle East in the first place. The trinity of conflicts from the Middle East came to Africa because of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand and the Arab Cold War on the other. Because of Gamal Abdul Nasser's campaign against Israel and Zionism in Africa, African states became the target of both Arab and Israeli propaganda. The Arabs capitalized on both Islam and Pan-Africanism to ingratiate themselves with the Africans.

On the other hand, the Israelis played on the fact that both blacks and Jews have historically suffered at the hands of other human groups. This idea of a community of suffering was an important card in the Israeli hand. Although in retrospect, one can now argue that this ideological game of the Middle Eastern states resulted in a mixed bag of Arab and Israeli victories, the fact remains that these two struggles imported into Africa set the stage for the revitalization of Islam in Africa.

To put it another way, I could say that political Islam in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa owed a great debt to the activities of secular Egypt under Nasser, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are unintended consequences because although Nasser gave thousands of scholarships to young Muslims to study and receive training at Egyptian centers of higher learning, he could not predict the fact that many of these young men and women would later return to Africa to replicate politically what he himself tried hard to prevent the Islamic Brotherhood from doing in Egypt. This post-colonial phenomenon of revitalized militant Islam was a revival of the colonial process of secularization that came with the advancing armies of the newly installed colonial powers.

The second factor responsible for the revivification of militant Islam was the Arab Cold War. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role and, ironically, the Western Powers who were totally preoccupied with the Cold War, wittingly or unwittingly supported this venture. Because Nasser and the Baathist forces in the Arab World were suspected to be collaborators with the Soviet Union, this Saudi at-

tempt to use Islam for political and strategic ends in Africa received some encouragement. Because of these political uses of Islam in Africa, the Saudi brand of Wahabism soon gained some attention in sub-Saharan Africa. This was most evident after the 1973 war between Israel and Arab states and the oil embargo and its aftermath.

For this discussion it should be noted here that the sharp rise in oil prices in the mid-1970's catapulted Saudi Arabia to the plateau of economic success, and this new state of affairs in Africa and world politics enhances Saudi prestige in Muslim circles.

Because of this development, thousands of young Muslims from various African lands went to study in Arabia. Saudi literature and Saudi-financed missionaries spread across the African continent. This process of Islamization became more intense after the Iranian Revolution, when it became evident to Saudi leaders that their brand of Islam could be threatened by the Shiite revolutionary state next door. The Iran-Iraq War was just one consequence of this war between the two major sects in the Islamic world.

In order for us to prosecute the war against terrorism in Africa successfully, we must recognized the fact that those who subscribe to militant Islam would like to conflate a fight for change in their parts of the world with the use of political violence to accomplish their goals. Manipulating Islamic texts on social justice and banking heavily on the need to resort to jihadic means to settle scores with the ruling elites of their societies, these system challengers of the Muslim African states could be influenced by forces in the Middle East.

Yet, because the African Muslim states are not homogeneous and their conditions are not identical, it would be dangerous and unwise to come up with one prescription. However, one should point out the fact that the cannon fodder for any terrorist acts are most likely going to be young Africans who are terribly indoctrinated about the poor state of Islam and Muslims in the world and the need to correct such inequities in the world system.

Although most African states, including predominantly Muslim countries, have majorities of young people, the chances for successful recruitment of sizable African armies for these purveyors of terrorism are limited. This is largely due to the degree of Western cultural penetration in most of the sub-Saharan African states and the growing fascination with creature comforts even when they do not have any means to realize their dream of owning things from the West.

Yet, this source of strength on the part—on our part could turn against us if the potential sources of dissatisfaction are not addressed through effective and meaningful aid program. Indeed, one irony of this war against global terrorism is the fact that when we failed to do for African—what we failed to do for African development during the Cold War must now be done with deliberate speed if we are going to curb the forces of terrorism and lay the foundations for a strong African link in the chains against global terrorism.

This idea of strengthening the African link in the chain against global terrorism, deserves our attention for important reasons. First, Africa is the weakest political territory to penetrate by inter-

national terrorists. The weakness of Africa lies in two factors. One is the weak nature of the African state, and the other is the corruptibility of the African political class. A combination of these two factors makes this vast continent an explosive Pandora's box.

The United States of America has worldwide interests and Africa consists a major part of that global strategic chain. For this and other related reasons it certainly makes political sense for U.S. policy makers to pay greater attention to Africa. The U.S. may often times play political Gulliver to the African Lilliputs; but in a world that is increasingly becoming dangerous and deadly, it would be politically prudent to strengthen materially and strategically the weakest links to your chain of self protection. Greater USAID involvement in the development process in Africa could make a big difference.

Secondly, the U.S. government must come to the realization that the war on global terrorism can only be won first in the minds and hearts of the African Muslims and then in the global battlefields. Here is where the democratic hand of the United States of America becomes a potential source of strength in the war against the terrorism. By supporting and strengthening the second wave of democratization in the African continent, U.S. leaders at all levels of government could make African governments, not only materially effective in dealing with the knotty problems of economic and social development, but they could also help in the planting of the seeds of democratic governance in many parts of Africa.

As in the Middle East, where the Cold War policies of the United States of America helped maintain many an autocratic regime, in many African states where Muslims live either as minorities or majorities, systems of government have not always been democratic. For this and other related reasons it makes good political sense for the U.S. Government to invest heavily in the democratic enterprise. Indeed, in the war against terrorism, the democratic card pays bigger dividends.

The third factor in this war against terrorism is for the U.S. Government to initiate a dialogue between African Muslims and the American people. By drawing upon its cultural and moral resources in the formulation and development of programs linking Americans and Africans, especially Muslim Africans, the United States of America could help set the state for the detalibanization of many African madrassas. These are Quranic schools, which could be breeding ground for any kind of Taliban, African side.

This is particularly so since in places like northern Nigeria the spirit of militant Islam has occasionally, over the last 30 years, taken the lives of thousands of people in inter-religious strife and violence. This state of affairs has developed in that part of Africa, largely because the lower classes, what they call in house, the talakwawa, have found in militant Islam avenues of self-expression. This is to say, these lower classes in northern Nigeria have vented their rage and anger through destructive actions against state and private property. Their emotional fragility and their vulnerability to the sloganeering of pie-in-the-sky rhetoric of Islamic militants, could ignite the fires of sectarianism and inter-religious warfare. This is the greatest danger to the democratic experiment now led by President Obasanjo.

By supporting scholars of Islam who show evidence of reform and modernization, the U.S. could help the advancement of such points of view through exchanges between American Muslim centers of learning and African Muslim centers of learning. This is one way of nipping in the bud any attempts at subversion and recruitment of African Muslim youth. The U.S. Government can only inoculate these young people from the promises and offers of the likes of Osama bin Laden when the bread and butter issues are addressed in their home countries. This is as true in Northern Nigeria, as in other parts of Western and Eastern Africa, places like Somalia, which is now a failed state.

The fourth and last factor in this war against global terrorism in Africa lies in the curriculum development of the African states. Even though African school textbooks have not generally fostered any sense of religious bigotry, there is still the greater need to encourage the cultivation of tolerance in the school system. Here the interfaith experiences of many urban areas of the United States could begin to be shared abroad. American missionaries abroad who have not taken pain to indulge in the art of inter-religious dialogue at home before their posting abroad may have to explore this unfamiliar territory in their own interest and in the long-term interest of their church and state.

Similarly, the U.S. Government must begin to study carefully how the American Muslim communities and their non-governmental organizations could contribute positively to the prosecution of this war against global terrorism through the dissemination of correct and reliable information about the American experience and the Muslims stake in it.

By encouraging such acts of patriotism among American Muslims, the U.S. authorities can make their Muslim minorities equal partners in the promotion of the American experiment abroad. This is a powerful, psychological, moral, and political weapon in the campaign against international terrorism.

I urge all Members of Congress to pay serious attention to this challenge for greater American involvement in Africa. There is so little to lose and so much to gain through such strategies. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I hope I added to what my colleagues have presented here.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Nyang follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SULAYMAN S. NYANG, PH.D., PROFESSOR, AFRICAN STUDIES, HOWARD UNIVERSITY

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack on the United States of America and the global reverberations it triggered made it categorically clear that even America is not safe anymore. The World Trade Center bombing of the early 1990's and the Oklahoma bombing that followed some years later, had already brought the United States of America within the circle of vulnerable states. The Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America were already at the center of the waves of terrorist attacks from the late 1960s onwards. Africa, potentially the most vulnerable part of the globe, did not however see the international character and the destructive power of terrorism until the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. Although political violence as terrorism was prevalent in the northern part of the continent, sub-Saharan Africans have not generally associated with terrorism the type of political violence perpetrated by African liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies and settler states of South Africa and Rhodesia. This earlier attitude toward political violence has historically colored the African opinions on and attitudes toward political violence and terrorism. The state of mind that accompanied this at-

titude was most evident during the final years of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

The linkage between terrorism and African societies can be traced back to the anti-colonial struggle. The Mau Mau uprisings in Kenya and the atrocities associated with it were generally characterized by the British authorities as acts of terrorism carried out by what was then perceived to be a predominately Kikyuy movement. The other instance of political violence that received the name terrorism was the Algerian uprising against French rule. This bloody uprising led to the death of thousands of Algerians and Frenchmen. Yet, until the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana, Cuba, sub-Sahara Africa did not witness any major forms of political violence one can retrospectively call terrorism. Up until the Havana conference, which declared the violence in waging wars of national liberation justifiable, the African liberation movements took the path of nonviolence to fight for political independence. This change of rhetoric and tactics in the prosecution of the national wars in former Portuguese territories and in the former settler states of South Africa and Rhodesia, would create the precedents for the employment of low level terrorism in these parts of the African continent. Although many system challengers of that period would now claim their acts to be those of the freedom fighters against oppressive regimes, their acts were perceived in most Western circles as violent acts of terrorism. These sentiments would affect the policies and decision of the U.S. government until the collapse of apartheid and the rise to power of the African National Congress.

It is indeed against this background that we now examine the rise of militant Islam in Africa. Before we go into any serious analysis of the potentials threat of Islamic militants to the United States of America, we must first identify the factors and forces responsible for the development of Islamic militancy in Africa. Before the collapse of the colonial orders in Africa, African Muslims were becoming increasingly secularized. This process of secularization was a global phenomenon and scholars like American social scientist Daniel Lerner saw it as "the passing of traditional society." This transition from a traditional society dominated by Islam to another on the verge of modernization, was widely celebrated by the champions of African and Arab nationalism. This was the heyday of African and Arab nationalism on the one hand and African and Arab socialism on the other. Taking place within the framework of the Cold War, this secularization process put Islam and religion generally on the defensive. In the special case of Africa, the only defenders of Islam were the traditional conservative members of the Ulema (learned scholars) and the sufi orders committed to Islamic mysticism (tassawuf). Because the young people were sold on the ideas of development and modernization Islam continued to be observed ritually but its political potency remained either underestimated or ignored completely by the political class. Three global and regional African developments would change the course of African and world history. The present state of Islamic militancy and terrorism in Africa and the world could be traced back to these changes in the international system.

The first development was the export into Africa of the political troubles of the Middle East. But before we go to the analysis of this development, let me remind my readers that the Middle East of the Cold War era was different from all other regions of the world because of the trinity of conflicts raging within its borders. The trinity of conflicts raging in the Middle East consists of the following: (i)bipolar Cold War between the United States of America and her Allies and the Soviet Union and her Eastern Bloc allies; (ii) the Arab-Israeli conflict; (iii) the Arab Cold War. To understand the present state of affairs regarding Islamic militancy in Africa and the potential for terrorism in Muslim lands and among Muslim minorities in African societies, one must first examine how the African Muslims became involved in the theater of conflicts in the Middle East. The trinity of conflicts from the Middle East came into Africa because of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the one hand and the Arab Cold War on the other. Because of Gamal Abdul Nasser's campaign against Israel and Zionism, African states became the target of both Arab and Israeli propaganda. The Arabs capitalized on both Islam and Pan-Africanism to ingratiate themselves with the Africans. On the other hand, the Israelis played on the fact that both blacks and Jews have historically suffered at the hands of other human groups. This idea of a community of suffering was an important card in the Israeli hand. Although in retrospect, one can now argue that this ideological game of the Middle Eastern states resulted in a mixed bag of Arab and Israeli victories, the fact remains that these two struggles imported into Africa set the stage for the revitalization of Islam in Africa. To put it another way, I could say that political Islam in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa owed a great debt to the activities of secular Egypt under Nasser, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. These are unintended consequences because although Nasser gave thousands of scholarships to young Mus-

lims to study and receive training at Egyptian centers of higher learning, he could not predict the fact that many of these young men and women would later return home to replicate politically what he himself tried hard to prevent the Islamic Brotherhood from doing in Egypt. This post colonial phenomenon of revitalized militant Islam, was a reversal of the colonial process of secularization that came with the advancing armies of the newly installed colonial powers.

The second factor responsible for the revivification of militant Islam was the Arab Cold War. Saudi Arabia played a crucial role and ironically the Western Powers who were totally preoccupied with the Cold War willingly or unwillingly supported this venture. Because Nasser and the Baathist forces in the Arab World were suspected to be collaborators with the Soviet Bloc, this Saudi attempt to use Islam for political and strategic ends in Africa received some encouragement. Because of these political uses of Islam in Africa, the Saudi brand of Wahabism soon gained some attention in sub-Saharan Africa. This was most evident after the 1973 War between Israel and Arab states and the oil embargo and its aftermath. For this discussion it should be noted here that the sharp rise in oil prices in the mid-1970's catapulted Saudi Arabis to the plateau of economic success, and this new state of affairs in Arab and world politics enhances Saudi prestige in Muslim circles. Because of this development, thousands of young Muslims from various African lands went to study in Arabia. Saudi literature and Saudi financed missionaries spread across the African continent. This process of Islamization became more intense after the Iranian Revolution, when it became evident to Saudi leaders that their brand of Islam could be threatened by the Shiite revolutionary state next door. The Iran-Iraq War was just one consequence of this war between the two major sects of the Islamic world.

In order for us to prosecute the war against terrorism in Africa successfully we must recognized the fact that those who subscribe to militant Islam would like to conflate the fight for change in their parts of the world with the use of political violence to accomplish their goals. Manipulating Islamic texts on social justice and banking heavily on the need to resort to jihadic means to settle scores with the ruling elites of their societies, these system challengers of the Muslim African states could be influenced by forces in the Middle East. Yet, because the African Muslim states are not homogeneous and their conditions are not identical, it would be dangerous and unwise to come up with one prescription. However, one should point out the fact that the cannon fodder for any terrorist acts are most likely going to be young Africans who are terribly indoctrinated about the poor state of Islam and Muslims in the world and the need to correct such inequities in the world system. Although most African states, including predominantly Muslim countries, have majorities of young people, the chances for successful recruitment of sizable African armies for these purveyors of terrorism are limited. This is largely due to the degree of Western cultural penetration in most of the sub-Saharan African states and the growing fascination with creature comforts even when they do not have any means to realize their dreams of owning things for the West. Yet, this source of strength on our part could turn against us if the potential sources of dis-satisfaction are not addressed through an effective and meaningful aid program. Indeed, one irony of this war against global terrorism is the fact that what we failed to do for African development during the Cold War must now be done with deliberate speed if we are to curb the forces of terrorism and lay the foundations for a strong African link in the chain against global terrorism.

This idea of strengthening the African link in the chain against global terrorism, deserves our attention for four important reasons. First, Africa is the weakest political territory to penetrate international terrorists. The weakness of Africa lies in two factors. One is the weak nature of the African state, and the other is the corrupt manner of the African political class. A combination of these two factors makes this vast continent an explosive Pandora's box. The United States of America has worldwide interests and Africa is a major part of that global strategic chain. For this and other related reasons it certainly makes political sense for U.S. policy makers to pay greater attention to Africa. The U.S. may often times play political Gulliver to the African Lilliputs; but in a world that is increasingly becoming dangerous and deadly, it would be politically prudent to strengthen materially and strategically the weakest links to your chain of self protection. Greater USAID involvement in the development process in Africa could make a big difference. Secondly, the U.S. government must come to the realization that the war on global terrorism can only be won first in the minds and hearts of the African Muslims and then in the global battlefields. Here is where the democratic hand of the United States of America becomes a potential source of strength in the war against the terrorists. By supporting and strengthening the second wave of democratization in the African continent, U.S. leaders at all levels of government could make African governments, not only materially effective in dealing with the knotty problems of economic and social develop-

ment, but they could also help in the planting of the seeds of democratic governance in many parts of Africa. As in the Middle East, where the Cold War policies of the United States of America helped maintain many an autocratic regime, in many African states where Muslims live either as minorities or majorities, systems of government have not always been democratic. For this and other related reasons it makes good political sense for the U.S. Government to invest heavily in the democratic enterprise. Indeed, in the war against terrorism, the democratic card pays bigger dividends.

The third factor in this war against terrorism is for the U.S. Government to initiate a dialogue between African Muslims and the American people. By drawing upon its own cultural and moral resources in the formulation and development of programs linking Americans and Africans, especially Muslim Africans, the United States of America could help set the state for "detalibization" of many African madrassas (Quranic schools). This is particularly so since in places like northern Nigeria the spirit of militant Islam has occasionally over the last thirty years taken the lives of thousands of people in interreligious strife and violence. This state of affairs has developed in that part of the African continent, largely because the lower classes (the talakwawa) have found in militant Islam avenues of self-expression. This is to say, these lower classes have vented their rage and anger through destructive actions against state and private property. Their emotional fragility and their vulnerability to the sloganeering of "pie in the sky" rhetoric of Islamic militants, could ignite the firs of sectarianism and inter-religious warfare.

By supporting scholars of Islam who show evidence of reform and modernization, the U.S. could help the advancement of such points of view through exchanges between American Muslim centers of learning and the African Muslim centers of learning. This is one way of nipping in the bud any attempts at subversion and recruitment of African Muslim youth. The U.S. Government can only inoculate these young people from the promises and offers of the likes of Osama Bin Laden when the bread and butter issues are addressed in their home countries. This is as true in Northern Nigeria, as in other parts of Western and Eastern Africa.

The fourth and last factor in this war on global terrorism in Africa lies in the curriculum development of the African states. Even though African school textbooks have not generally fostered any sense of religious bigotry, there is still the greater need to encourage the cultivation of tolerance in the school system. Here the interfaith experiences of many urban areas of the United States must begin to be shared abroad. American missionaries abroad who have not taken pain to indulge in the art of inter-religious dialogue at home before their pointing abroad may have to explore this unfamiliar territory in their own interest and in the long-term interest of their church and state. Similarly, the U.S. Government must begin to study carefully how the American Muslim communities and their non-governmental organizations could contribute positively to the prosecution of this war against global terrorism through the dissemination of correct and reliable information about the American experience and the Muslims stake in ti. By encouraging such acts of patriotism among American Muslims, the U.S. authorities can make their Muslim minorities equal partners in the promotion of the American experiment abroad. This is a powerful, psychological, moral and political weapon in the campaign against terrorism. I urge all members of Congress to pay serious attention to this challenge for greater American involvement in Africa. There is so little to lose and so much to gain.

Mr. PAYNE [presiding]. Well, thank you very much. Let me say that I appreciate the testimony from all of you, although I only heard two of the three. But let me certainly say, Dr. Nyang, that was very—a thorough historical document, and I think that it was certainly important, not only for me, and we have it here in the text, but for the people in the audience. And thank you very much for that.

Mr. NYANG. Thank you.

Mr. PAYNE. And we will have to kind of speed up. We have been trying to prevent adjourning as these votes go on. So we—I will just be brief so that we can share the remaining time because we will have to both leave.

And I just wonder—let me just ask a general question to the three of you. Is U.S. policy attune to the growth of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa? And if you think it is, then what changes in U.S.

policy would you make? And how can the U.S. counter the blatant falsehoods prevalent that the fight against terrorism is a fight against Islam? As you know, it is being terrorized that this is a jihad, that the U.S. is against Islam. That is not what it is. It is against the terrorists. So if you had the opportunity, what would be your suggestions? We will start with you, Dr. Rice, and move right on through.

Ms. RICE. Thank you. I think, first of all, to answer your question directly, I don't think we are sufficiently attuned to the growth of Islam in Africa. And before we are even well-positioned to answer what implications being attuned would have to our policy, I think we need to address some of the reasons why we are not sufficiently well-attuned.

And I think that gets to some of the points that Steve outlined, particularly in his written testimony and in some depth. We don't have, to this day, on the ground in Africa, sufficient personnel and expertise to understand as well as we need to what is going on in a number of these societies. We have got very small, understaffed embassies, which don't have the people and the wherewithal to cover goings on at the grass roots level in many of these countries.

One point that Steve made, I think, very effectively in his written text, and I want to underscore, is I cannot begin to tell you how ill-equipped we are from an intelligence collection point of view in Africa. And I realize this is not a classified hearing and I am not going to go into a great deal of depth, but suffice it to say, this was something that I found extremely troubling as a policy maker. And it is not getting any better. That is a battle we tried to fight. But this is something—an area where I believe Congress could really play a leadership role.

Back in the early '90s there was a retrenchment of our human and other collection assets in Africa, and we have been paying the price for that ever since. And unless we ramp up on that level, along with on the diplomatic and public diplomacy side, we are going to be fighting with one hand tied behind our back.

The other thing I would say goes to the point of public diplomacy, which, I think, all three of us touched on, at least in our written testimony, I am glad to see the Administration begin to look for creative ways to fight the public diplomacy battle on many fronts, but it can't leave Africa out of that mix. And I think Africa is not viewed either as a target or as an opportunity for the United States when it comes to winning hearts and minds. And I would like to take my hat off to Dr. Nyang for some very creative suggestions about how to use the American Muslim community more effectively in that effort.

Mr. MORRISON. Thank you. Just a few points to remind us of some of the steps that have been taken. This Administration opened its doors pretty early on to President Obasanjo, President Mbeki, President Wade of Senegal, Konare of Mali, and Moi of Kenya. It is a dialogue in the aftermath of September 11, particularly in the Horn of Africa. It has been aggressive at trying to stand up to Special Envoy to Sudan, Senator Danforth, and has appointed Andrew Natsios, the Administrator of USAID, as a humanitarian emissary and has empowered Roger Winter, the head of OFDA, at USAID, to carry forward a number of creative initiatives.

I see that as certainly a sensitivity. They have outlined that they are not anti-Islam. They are, with respect to Sudan, that they are against egregious human rights violations, forced abductions, and slavery, the perpetuation of this awful war. They have made clear that, on a humanitarian basis, we are prepared to bring substantial humanitarian aid into northern Sudan to benefit those persons at risk because of the drought in Darfur and Fasher.

These are important steps. We have not advertised them particularly well, I suppose. And I think that we have facilities like the Horn of Africa Service. It could be pretty much more an assertive use in that respect. So I think that there are some important things that have been done that give us a basis diplomatically and politically to move forward in carrying out some of the actions that Susan and others have outlined. Perhaps, Dr. Nyang would like to add a few words. Thank you.

Mr. ROYCE [presiding]. Thank you, Dr. Morrison.

Mr. NYANG. Chairman Royce, I think I would just briefly identify three areas, policies, problems, and personnel, in that order—the three "P's" for U.S. policy in Africa.

I think in order to deal with international terrorism in Africa, the root causes of international terrorism in the African context must be addressed. And that is poverty. Many of the young people whom might very well be recruited by terrorist groups are young people who are completely desperadoes. And many of them, if you look at what has happened, you find that many of these young people used to go to Libya to find jobs and then were recruited.

And people like Charles Taylor and others were beneficiaries of that kind of generation of young people who found themselves unemployed. They found themselves in what psychologists will call status inconsistency. You have education, however you are doing a job way below your education. And, of course, this is a problem. So in terms of policy, I think greater material development in Africa becomes very imperative.

Secondly, another policy imperative would be to push the democratic process. That is one reason why I am very pleased to see that President Wade of Senegal, President Obasanjo and Konare from Mali, and Mbeki, who are all democratically elected leaders of their societies, have been taken into account in this regard.

Now, with regard to problems, I think the State Department is beginning to move in that direction. There are things going on which will become evident, I am sure, in the coming months with regard to so many things that are being undertaken.

And I think with respect to personnel, I promised one of the INS people in Ghana that I will meet publicly with you, Chairman, when you agree to meet, they didn't even have computers that help them do their job. And then so this goes with what Susan is saying that, you know, the very—I mean, most of us have this idea that the American Embassies in Africa, they have everything that is high tech. That is not true. And, you know, like—and I promised that I will visit with you. And I take this opportunity here to—so that the journalists will make this point, so that their point of view is being reported today.

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. You had another point, Dr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. Can I just add very quickly—Somalia—we walked away from Somalia in '93, '94, much as we walked away from Afghanistan at the end of the Cold War. And that creates vulnerabilities and enormous challenges in grasping what is going on internally and grasping what is going on among the neighboring states. And I think that is our key vulnerability. We have walked toward Sudan because of the enormous mobilization of constituencies here in the United States.

I think we have got a reasonably clear policy. We are aware of the risks and we need to keep pushing hard on that. I think the constituencies will remain very active. I think Danforth and his effort and Natsios and others has a unity of purpose. There is support emerging both within the diplomatic establishment and the constituent—the activist constituencies.

On Nigeria and South Africa, we have had very, very limited dialogue with the government on what it means to have 12 of 36 states in a breakaway Sharia status in which you have opportunities, flows of people commodities and finances, through a very porous system into those 12 states, which there are significant linkages in with militant Islamic external entities.

Similarly, with South Africa, we have had very limited bilateral dialogue with them about those entities that are linked to al-Qaeda.

Mr. ROYCE. I wonder how much bilateral dialogue we have had with Saudi Arabia about the fact that these Madras schools are funded by the Saudis. I also wonder how much dialogue with the Saudis there is about the fact that we didn't have the intelligence on the ground to pick all of this up. But it seems to me that not only has this gone on unnoticed, but it continually seems to expand without comment by the West as Wahabism is introduced, not only throughout northern Nigeria, but throughout Africa, Central Asia, East Asia, and wherever there is the opportunity for the Saudis to build a new mosque and another new Madras school. They may take that opportunity.

Mr. MORRISON. Right. Right.

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Nyang, you talked about the detalibanization of this situation. How do you detalibanize what is happening in the Madras schools where the offer is an offer nobody can refuse? We give the money. We build you the school. We have only one condition. We bring in the instructor. And by the time the graduating class is out of there, we suddenly find we have got a problem in that town. The town finds, Nigeria finds, we all find, that we have a problem. Because that is not Islam the way that most of us understand Islam. It is a new interpretation of a very, very confrontational and jihadi form of Islam. I wondered about your thoughts on this.

Ms. RICE. I don't want to beat a dead horse, but I think this comes back to what was my central thesis, and I think it was a thesis shared by the other two panelists. We cannot leave a vacuum——

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Ms. RICE [continuing]. In Africa——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE [continuing]. For those with hostile agendas to fill. And that means we are going to have to put our monies where our mouth is. Over the last many years, it has been, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE [continuing]. Investors from Saudi Arabia, also from Libya, and other parts of North Africa and the Middle East who come in with agendas that, in many respects, are antithetical to our own and they are very generous philanthropists. The problem is, as you say, it comes with some serious strings attached.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Ms. RICE. And we can't fight something with nothing. Which is not to say we are doing nothing, but I—to use Steve's term, we have to bring our efforts to scale.

Mr. ROYCE. I concur.

Ms. RICE. And scale, in this instance, is a level much higher than we might have anticipated a year or two or more ago.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes. Dr. Morrison.

Mr. MORRISON. I think we also need to be careful in many instances, for instance, in Muslim communities within Ethiopia—there was a surge of resources that came in, largely from Saudi Arabia, in support of Muslim social activism. And it provided a—it was in the context of a very depleted state, great poverty, post-war situation. These forms of activism didn't translate into a militant, violent Wahabism that threatened others within Ethiopia or the others within the surrounding region.

Mr. ROYCE. I see.

Mr. MORRISON. It brought stability. It brought education, health, social welfare, and security. It is a terribly difficult challenge before us in looking at Al-Itihaad in central Somalia to distinguish between the valid and legitimate activities of some of these agencies versus those that are providing permissive environments and havens.

Mr. ROYCE. I understand.

Mr. MORRISON. And——

Mr. ROYCE. Dr. Nyang, what are your observations?

Mr. NYANG. And let me just respond to this. I think this is where the historical narrative becomes very useful.

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG. What counts really more is that during the Cold War when the Egyptians under Nasser were waging wars against the royal families in the Gulf, interesting enough, the United States and the western countries supported and encouraged these activities. This is one of the tragedies of what we are reaping now. Because many of these militants——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. Islamic militants were condoned and accepted during the Cold War. Now, after the Cold War, they become freelance——

Mr. ROYCE. To wage war on the Saudi oil family you said?

Mr. NYANG. No. What I am saying is that during the Cold War——

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. The militant groups in Egypt, in Syria, and other places, who were being pursued by their own secular government, the Baathists or the Nasserites, fled to the Gulf. Now, Saudi Arabians don't have qualified people to go to Africa. They don't have many educated people. At that time——

Mr. ROYCE. I see your point.

Mr. NYANG. So they have to recruit Egyptians to go and teach——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. In Africa. So that is what you have.

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Mr. NYANG. This international brigade we are talking about——

Mr. ROYCE. Right.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. Capable—likely recall the Saudis were able to recruit Muslim militants for these governments in Syria, in Iraq, and in Egypt, and then they send them to Africa to teach Arabic or Islam. So what has happened as a result is that these groups were really strained bedfellows——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. Would-be sponsors, you know. And I think John Cooley made this very clearly in his book——

Mr. ROYCE. Yes.

Mr. NYANG [continuing]. With regard to Afghanistan when he talks about this phenomenon.

Mr. ROYCE. Sure. Well, I have got a series of votes here and so I just want to thank all of you for coming down today to testify before the Committee and for your thoughts. And I certainly think you made some very good points. And you are right, Dr. Rice, nature abhors a vacuum, and it has been quite a vacuum, and this Committee is dedicated to try and reverse that. Thank you very much for being here today.

Mr. NYANG. Thank you very much, Congressman.

[Whereupon, at 3:26 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]

Æ